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ABSTRACT
Current computational trust models are usually built either
on an agent's direct experience of an interaction partner (in-
teraction trust) or reports provided by third parties about
their experiences with a partner (witness reputation). How-
ever, both of these approaches have their limitations. Mod-
els using direct experience often result in poor performance
until an agent has had a su±cient number of interactions
to build up a reliable picture of a particular partner and
witness reports rely on self-interested agents being willing
to freely share their experience. To this end, this paper
presents Certi¯ed Reputation (CR), a novel model of trust
that can overcome these limitations. Speci¯cally, CR works
by allowing agents to actively provide third-party references
about their previous performance as a means of building up
the trust in them of their potential interaction partners. By
so doing, trust relationships can quickly be established with
very little cost to the involved parties. Here we empirically
evaluate CR and show that it helps agents pick better in-
teraction partners more quickly than models that do not
incorporate this form of trust.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Arti¯cial Intelligence]: Distributed Arti¯cial In-
telligence|Multiagent systems
General Terms
Design, Reliability, Experimentation
Keywords
Trust, Reputation, Multi-Agent Systems
1. INTRODUCTION
A wide variety of networked computer systems (such as the
Grid, the Semantic Web, and peer-to-peer systems) can be
viewed as multi-agent systems (MAS) in which the individ-
ual components act in an autonomous and °exible manner in
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order to achieve their objectives. An important class of these
systems are those that are open; here de¯ned as systems in
which agents can freely join and leave at any time and where
the agents are owned by various stakeholders with di®erent
aims and objectives. From these two features, it can be as-
sumed that in an open MAS: (1) the agents are likely to be
self-interested and may not always complete tasks that are
requested of them; (2) no agent can know everything about
its environment; and (3) no central authority can control
all the agents. Given such uncertainties, trust is central to
e®ective interactions between the agents [7]. Indeed, this
recognition accounts for the large number of computational
models of trust (here de¯ned as the subjective probability
with which an agent a assesses that another agent b will
perform a particular action, both before a can monitor such
action and in a context in which it a®ects its own action [2])
that help agents to determine the most reliable interaction
partner (see Section 4 for more details).
Although there are many di®erences in the way these mod-
els are implemented, the majority of them are built on an
agent's direct experience of an interaction partner (interac-
tion trust) or reports provided by third parties about their
experiences with a partner (witness reputation). However,
both these approaches have their shortcomings. First, when
an agent ¯rst enters an environment, it has no history of
interactions (with the other agents in that environment). In
such circumstances, if its trust model is based solely on di-
rect experience, it would need to explore the environment
by interacting with other agents to learn about their perfor-
mance. However, in so doing, the agent also inevitably risks
making losses if it encounters unreliable partners. Moreover,
because it can learn about only one agent per interaction,
trust models using direct experience typically require a long
time to be able to achieve stable performance. Second, mod-
els based on witness reports usually implicitly assume the al-
truism of agents in sharing their experiences. Now, this can-
not be guaranteed in all cases because self-interested agents
are unlikely to be willing to sacri¯ce their resources in order
to provide witness reports. Moreover, in the distributed and
open environments we consider, the required witnesses for
any given agent can be di±cult to locate. This is usually
addressed by using some form of centralised mechanism to
collect all the witness reports [13] or implementing a dis-
tributed search process to look for witnesses in an agent's
social network [12]. However, the former is not compati-
ble with an open MAS since agents representing di®erent
owners may well question the trustworthiness of a central
authority and the latter may well involve high costs of timeand resources to locate witnesses.
Against this background, in this paper we present a novel
type of trust called certi¯ed reputation (CR) whose mecha-
nism overcomes the limitations of current trust models de-
scribed above. Hence, CR can be used complementarily to
other sources of trust information (e.g. direct experience,
witness reports) to build a versatile composite trust model
(which bene¯ts from all the advantages of its components).
In more detail, the CR of an agent is the reputation that is
derived from third-party references about its previous per-
formance. Agents that adopt the CR mechanism will ac-
tively collect and present such references in order to seek
the trust of their potential partners. This, in turn, moves
the burden of obtaining and maintaining trust information
from the trust evaluator to the agent being evaluated (who
is incentivised to do so)
1. Hence, trust information (refer-
ences) about a particular agent becomes available to those
who want to interact with it. Moreover, agents using CR
have neither to interact ¯rst with the agent being evalu-
ated (as they do with direct experience), nor to locate its
witnesses (as they do with witness reports). The potential
downside, however, is that third-party references might not
be reliable (since referees can collude with particular agents
by providing falsely in°ated references for them and nega-
tive ones for the others). Now, this is an inherent problem
of using any type of third-party information and so it is im-
portant to be able to evaluate the credibility of a referee
and to use this to weigh its information. To this end, we
also develop such a model that records the history of a ref-
eree's performance in terms of providing accurate references
(by comparing an agent's actual observations with the ref-
erences it receives). Such histories of referees are then used
to derive their credibility.
In so doing, we advance the state of the art in the fol-
lowing ways. First, we develop a new process of obtaining
information for trust evaluation. This process addresses the
inherent shortcomings of interaction trust (the lack of direct
experience) and witness reputation (the di±culty in ¯nding
witness reports). Second, as CR allows agents to be able
to evaluate trust themselves, without relying on a central
mechanism, it is compatible with a wide range of open and
distributed environments. Third, from empirical evaluation,
it is shown that using CR improves an agent's utility gain by
helping it to quickly pick good interaction partners. Finally,
it is shown that our model is robust against various types of
collusion.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
presents our model of certi¯ed reputation. This model is
then empirically evaluated in Section 3. Section 4 presents
related work and Section 5 concludes.
2. CERTIFIED REPUTATION
A trust model is typically used by an agent, say agent a, to
evaluate the trustworthiness of another agent, say agent b,
when it considers establishing an interaction with b. In this
case, we call a the evaluator and b the target. Now, most
trust evaluation is based on past experience of the target
agent's performance. Such experience is here recorded in
1It can reasonably be assumed that agents want to have
more interactions because of their potential utility gain.
Hence, agents have incentives to provide trust information
about themselves so that they can gain the trust of other
agents which, in turn, will facilitate more interactions.
the form of ratings which are tuples of the following form:
r = (a;b;i;c;v); where a and b are the agents that partici-
pated in interaction i, and v is the rating a gave b for the
term c. For instance, the quality of a news provider can
be rated in terms of topicality, quality, and honesty. Here,
the range of v is [¡1;+1], where ¡1, +1, and 0 means abso-
lutely negative, absolutely positive, and neutral respectively.
Each agent has a local rating store to collect the ratings it
makes and the ones that it receives from others. Since rat-
ings are context-dependent (described in the rating terms),
each trust evaluation is also about a speci¯c term. Here,
we use T (a;b;c) to denote the trustworthiness of b in terms
of c that is evaluated by a. In order to make such a trust
evaluation, a needs to obtain a set of relevant ratings. We
call this set R(a;b;c).
Now, having de¯ned the basic notions, we turn to the CR
model itself. The mechanism of CR is given in Section 2.1,
which also describes how CR is calculated. Then Section 2.2
shows how the credibility of referees is evaluated.
2.1 The Mechanism of Certiﬁed Reputation
Certi¯ed reputation of a target agent b consists of a num-
ber of certi¯ed references
2 about its behaviour on particular
tasks that are provided by third-party agents. Such infor-
mation is obtained and stored by the target agent itself and
made available to any other agent that wishes to evaluate
its trustworthiness for further interactions (somewhat like a
reference when a person is applying for a job). The agents
giving references are called the referees. Here, references are
in the form of ratings given by b's partners about its perfor-
mance in (past) interactions between them. These ratings
allow b to prove its (achievable) performance as viewed by
its previous interaction partners and then to gain the trust
of its potential partners. However, since b can choose which
ratings to put forward, a rational agent will only present its
best ones. Therefore, it should be assumed that CR informa-
tion probably overestimates an agent's expected behaviour.
Thus, although it cannot guarantee b's minimal performance
in future interactions, the CR information does reveal a par-
tial perspective on agent b's capabilities (which is certainly
useful for trust evaluation in the absence of other sources of
information).
Though CR may have lower predictive power than the
other types of trust/reputation (where all bad and good
ratings can be collected), it is useful because of its wide
applicability. With the cooperation of its partners, agent
b can obtain their references from just a small number of
interactions
3. From our evaluation, for instance, in a soci-
ety where 100 agents provide a service to 500 others, agents
using direct experience to evaluate trust require more than
100 interactions to achieve a reasonable level of utility gain,
2It is assumed that some form of security mechanism (such
as a public-key infrastructure) is employed to ensure that the
provided references cannot be tampered with. For instance,
all references could be accompanied by digital signatures
from the issuers using their private keys [14]. By so doing,
any change to a reference will be easily detected. Digital
signatures are also a means to verify the references' origins.
3In many scenarios, such as those in the Internet, established
service providers (e.g. news service, online merchants) usu-
ally have high volumes of interactions (at any time). There-
fore, if they adopt the CR process outlined here, we can
reasonably expect that such providers will have an abun-
dance of performance ratings readily available.which is still less than that achieved by agents using CR af-
ter 5 interactions (see Section 3 for more detail). In addition
to its high availability, since references are stored by the tar-
get agent and provided directly to the evaluator, CR has a
very low running cost (i.e. time, communication, processing
cost) compared to sources like witness reputation.
In more detail, the process of CR is as follows:
² After every transaction, agent b asks its partners to
provide their certi¯ed ratings about its performance
from which it can choose the best ratings to store in
its (local) rating store.
² When agent a contacts b to express its interest in using
b's service, it asks b to provide references about its past
performance with respect to an interested term c.
² Agent a receives the set of certi¯ed ratings of b from
b, which we call RC(a;b;c) (C to denote this set is
obtained via the CR mechanism), and calculates the
CR of b based on this set.
In this process, since agent b relies on its interaction part-
ner's cooperation to get references, agents may refuse to
give out their ratings (as in the case of witness reputation).
However, this is a much smaller problem than that in wit-
ness reputation because this information is requested far less
frequently (each referee is requested to give its rating only
once). Moreover, giving such information could be made a
standard part of any agreement for task allocation and so
agents could be forced to give it. The most notable point in
this process is that when agent a makes the trust evaluation,
it only involves agents a and b. Since the certi¯ed ratings
about b are stored by b itself, they are immediately available
to a as in the case when a uses its own experience.
Having obtained the references of b, a can estimate b's
future behaviour, or more speci¯cally, the expected rating
value b is likely to receive in a future interaction. A common
way to estimate that value is to calculate it as the arithmetic
mean of all the rating values in the set. However, these rat-
ings are usually not equally relevant when estimating the ex-
pected rating value. For example, some ratings may be older
than others and, thus, may be out-of-date; and some may
come from a more reliable source that suggests a higher level
of credibility compared to others. Therefore, like many con-
temporary models [8, 10, 12], we use a rating weight function
!C(ri) (!C(ri) ¸ 0) which calculates the relevance of each
given certi¯ed rating ri. Then, instead of considering all
ratings equally, the trust value is calculated as the weighted
mean of all the ratings available
4:
TC(a;b;c) =
P
ri2RC(a;b;c) !C(ri) ¢ vi
P
ri2RC(a;b;c) !C(ri)
(1)
where TC(a;b;c) is the CR value of b that agent a calculates
with respect to term c, which is calculated from the rating
set RC(a;b;c), and vi is the value of the rating ri. In short,
the CR value is calculated as the sum of all the available
ratings weighted by the rating relevance and normalised to
the range of [¡1;1] (by dividing the sum by the sum of all
the weights).
Now, we need to determine the relevancy of a given rating
(!C(ri)). Since an agent's environment may change rapidly,
4We choose the weighted mean method here because it al-
lows us to take the relevance of each rating into account.
Other aggregation methods could equally well be used if de-
sired.
resulting in out-of-date ratings, we use the recency of ratings
as one measure of their relevance. Speci¯cally, the recency
relevance of a rating ri is calculated by an exponential decay
function based on its recency [5]:
!Re(ri) = e
¡
¢t(ri)
¸ (2)
where !Re(ri) is the relevance value for the rating ri in terms
of recency, ¢t(ri) is the time di®erence between the current
time and the time when the rating ri is recorded, and ¸ is
the recency factor which is used to scale ¢t(ri) according to
a particular application's time unit.
As certi¯ed ratings are digitally signed, their authenticity
can be veri¯ed and their content cannot be tampered with.
However, since there is no guarantee about the honesty of
agents in an open MAS, a referee can still collude with the
target agent and provide falsely in°ated references about
its performance. Moreover, even if the referee is honest in
providing references, its references can be inaccurate (either
because of its incapability of making accurate ratings or be-
cause it has a di®erent view to that of the evaluator). In
either case, these inaccurate references will result in inaccu-
rate CR values. Therefore, we need measures to prevent or
to minimise the adverse e®ects of such references. To this
end, we use the credibility of referees as another measure
of rating relevance. In more detail, for a reference ri from
referee w, w's credibility value is calculated by a (called
TRCr(a;w) 2 [¡1;1], RCr denotes referee credibility). Then,
the relevance of ri in terms of referee credibility (denoted by
!RCr(ri)) is de¯ned as follows:
!RCr(ri) =
￿
0 if TRCr(a;w) · 0
TRCr(a;w) otherwise (3)
Both the above measures of rating relevancy are then
taken into account in weighing a rating:
!C(ri) = !RCr(ri) ¢ !Re(ri) (4)
It should be noted that, from Equations 3 and 4, refer-
ences whose referees have negative credibility are discarded
(by setting !C(ri) = 0). Only references whose referees have
positive credibility are taken into account when calculating
CR. In such cases, they are weighted both by their refer-
ees' credibility and by their recency. In so doing, ratings
from the more credible referees make a bigger impact on the
CR value than those from the less credible ones. In cases
where all the certi¯ed ratings collected are disregarded, due
to negative credibility of their providers, no trust value will
be produced. In such circumstances, agent a can give b a
default low trust value (e.g. ¡0:5) because b fails to provide
reliable references. Otherwise, agent a can re-request b for
more reliable references.
2.2 Referee Credibility
The credibility of a referee in reporting its ratings about an-
other agent can be derived from a number of sources. These
include knowledge about: the relationships between the ref-
eree and the rated agent (e.g. cooperating partners may ex-
aggerate each other's performance, competing agents may
underrate their opponents, no relationship may imply im-
partial ratings); the reputation of the referee for being hon-
est and expert in the ¯eld in which it is doing the rating (e.g.
a reputable and independent ¯nancial consultant should pro-
vide fair ratings about the services of various banks); the re-
lationships between the referee and the querying agent (e.g.agents with the same owner should provide honest reports
to one another); and so on. Unfortunately, however, such
types of knowledge are very application speci¯c and may not
be readily available in many cases. Therefore, although they
could certainly be used to enhance the precision of a referee
credibility measure, they are not suitable as a generic basis
(although they could complement a generic measure in par-
ticular contexts). Therefore, here, we base our solution on a
modi¯ed version of the witness credibility model we devised
for evaluating witness reputation in [4] to assess a referee's
credibility. We choose this model because it does not re-
quire such domain-speci¯c information about relationships
and because providing witness reports and references are of
the same broad nature. Speci¯cally, in this model, we view
providing references as a service an agent provides. Thus
its performance (i.e. trustworthiness and reliability) can be
evaluated and predicted by a trust model. By so doing, the
credibility model can bene¯t from a trust model's ability of
learning and predicting an agent's behaviour (in this case,
the behaviour of providing accurate reports) without having
to implement its own method.
In more detail, after having an interaction with agent b,
agent a records its rating about b's performance, denoted
by ra (ra = (a;b;ia;c;va)). Now, if agent a received a ref-
erence (i.e. a certi¯ed rating) from agent w, it then rates
the credibility of w by comparing the actual performance
of b (i.e. va) with w's rating about b. The smaller the dif-
ference between the two rating values, the higher agent w
is rated in terms of providing accurate references (mutatis
mutandis for bigger di®erences). For each certi¯ed rating
that a received from w in evaluating the CR of b (denoted
by rk = (w;b;ik;c;vk)), the credibility rating value vw for
agent w is given in the following formula:
vw =
￿
1 ¡ jvk ¡ vaj if jvk ¡ vaj < ¶
¡1 if jvk ¡ vaj ¸ ¶ (5)
where ¶ is called the inaccuracy tolerance threshold (0 · ¶ ·
2, 2 is the maximal di®erence since vk;va 2 [¡1;1]). Thus
if the di®erence between a certi¯ed rating value and the ac-
tual performance is higher than ¶, the referee is considered
to be inaccurate or lying, and, therefore, receives a negative
rating of ¡1 for its credibility. On the other hand, if the
di®erence is within the tolerance threshold, it can be viewed
as resulting from a subjective viewpoint and is deemed ac-
ceptable. In this case, the credibility rating value vw is set
to be inversely varied to the di®erence (e.g. higher di®er-
ence, lower credibility). Since 0 · jvn¡vaj · 2, vw is also in
the range [¡1;1] regardless of ¶. The rating about w's credi-
bility|rw = (a;w;iw;termRCr;vw)|is then recorded by a,
where termRCr is the rating term for performance in provid-
ing references and iw is the interaction of agent w providing
agent a the certi¯ed rating rk about agent b.
Having recorded ratings about w's performance on provid-
ing references, a can evaluate w's credibility based on those
ratings. As mentioned above, a can use its own trust model
for so doing. Speci¯cally, here we calculate a's trust on w's
capability of providing accurate references similarly as per
CR (Equation 1), except that we use only ratings retrieved
from a's ratings store (instead of obtaining them via the CR
mechanism) and weigh the ratings only by their recency
5
5Since a makes the ratings itself, weighing them in terms of
referee credibility is irrelevant.
(Equation 2). This type of trust is here called interaction
trust (IT) since it is based solely on a's direct experience
from its interactions. The IT value of a on b in terms of c is
denoted by TI(a;b;c) and is calculated as follows:
TI(a;b;c) =
P
ri2RI(a;b;c) !I(ri) ¢ vi
P
ri2RI(a;b;c) !I(ri)
(6)
where !I(ri) is the rating weight of ri and !I(ri) = !Re(ri).
Then, in order to determine the referee credibility of w
(TRCr(a;w)), we need to calculate TI(a;b;termRCr). This is
calculated from the set of termRCr ratings|RI(a;b;termRCr).
However, if no such rating has been recorded, and, thus, the
IT value is not available, we assign w the default referee
credibility trust value, denoted by TDRCr:
TRCr(a;w) =
￿
TI(a;w;termRCr) if RI(a;w;termRCr) 6= ;
TDRCr otherwise
(7)
It should be noted here that, at ¯rst, every referee receives
the default credibility value since it has not provided refer-
ences to agent a before. Hence, end users can set the value
of TDRCr to re°ect their policy towards newly encountered
referees. For example, TDRCr can be set to 0 so that newly
encountered referees are disregarded until they prove to be
credible (by providing ratings in the acceptable accuracy
threshold) or it can be set to 1 so that all referees are con-
sidered to be accurate and honest until proven otherwise.
3. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In order to empirical evaluate our CR model, we use the
testbed designed in [5] with a few changes. In more detail, in
order to verify our intuitions about CR, it will be evaluated
in ideal (honest) environments where agents do not collude
with each other (Section 3.3). It will then be evaluated in
(biased) environments where colluding agents give high rat-
ings to each other (Section 3.4) to determine its robustness
for open multi-agent contexts. Before doing this, however,
a brief description of the testbed is given in Section 3.1 (see
[5] for a complete description and for justi¯cations of the
choices we made in it) and Section 3.2 presents the method-
ology and experimental settings for our experiments.
3.1 The Testbed
The testbed is a multi-agent system consisting of agents pro-
viding services (called providers) and agents using those ser-
vices (called consumers). Without loss of generality, it is as-
sumed that there is only one type of service in the testbed.
Hence, all the provider agents o®er the same service. How-
ever, their performance (i.e. the quality of the service) dif-
fers. The agents are situated randomly on a spherical world
whose radius is 1:0. Each agent has a radius of operation
ro that models its capability in interacting with others (e.g.
the available bandwidth or the agent's infrastructure). In
addition, each consumer agent has a maximum number of
friend providers (NFP) that it may collude with when pro-
viding references about their performance. Such providers
are selected randomly from a consumer's nearby providers
when it enters the testbed.
Simulations are run in the testbed in rounds (of agent in-
teractions), and the round number is used as the time unit.
In each round, if a consumer agent needs to use the service
it can contact the environment to locate nearby provider
agents (in terms of the distance between the agents on thespherical world). The consumer agent will then select one
provider from the list to use its service. The selection process
relies on the agent's trust model to decide which provider is
likely to be the most reliable. Consumer agents without a
trust model randomly select a provider from the list. The
consumer agent then uses the service of the selected provider
and gains some utility from the interaction (called UG). The
value of UG is in [¡10;10] and depends on the level of perfor-
mance of the provider in that interaction. A provider agent
can serve many consumers at a time.
After an interaction, the consumer agent will rate the ser-
vice of the provider based on the level of performance it
received and provide the rating to the provider to be po-
tentially used as a reference. A provider will select NR best
references from those that it receives to store and to present
when requested. Since a provider knows very old references
are unlikely to be valued highly by its consumers, when
selecting references to store, it takes into account both a
reference's rating value (i.e. saying how well the provider
performed) and the time when that reference is made. In
particular, when comparing two references r1 and r2, the
value of r1 is biased by an amount of
t1¡t2
TIMESCALE, where ti
is the time that reference ri is given, and TIMESCALE is se-
lected to be 20:0 given the time unit used in the testbed
6.
In addition, since a referee may make biased references,
we model this phenomenon by introducing ¯ve types of ref-
erees. Agents in the Hon group always give out their actual
ratings as references. Exaggerating referees in groups Exag1
and Exag2, however, give falsely higher ratings than those
they actually recorded for their friend providers
7 (and their
actual ratings for the others). In addition to giving falsely
in°ated references for their friends, extreme referees in Extr1
and Extr2 also deliberately underrate the other providers.
The di®erence between an actual rating value and its inac-
curate one in Exag1 and Extr1 is randomly set in the range
[0:3;1:0] (i.e. representing marginally inaccurate referees)
and the respective range of Exag2 and Extr2 is [1:0;2:0] (i.e.
representing extremely inaccurate referees).
In our testbed, the only di®erence in each interaction sit-
uation is the performance of the provider agents. Here, we
consider four types of providers: good, ordinary, bad, and
intermittent. Each of them, except the last, has a mean level
of performance, denoted by ¹P. Its actual performance fol-
lows a normal distribution around this mean. The values of
¹P and the associated standard deviation (¾P) of these types
of providers are given in Table 1. Intermittent providers, on
the other hand, yield unpredictable (random) performance
levels in the range [PL BAD;PL GOOD]. In addition, the ser-
vice quality of a provider is also degraded linearly in pro-
portion to the distance between it and the consumer to re-
°ect the greater uncertainties associated with service deliv-
ery (e.g. lower service quality resulting from increased de-
lays or losses in information exchanges between two agents
when they are far away from each other). Hence, from the
same provider, each consumer may receive a di®erent level of
service quality depending on its location. This means honest
6This is obviously just one way of comparing two references
but it is a way that is e®ective in our system. If we wanted
to make rating recency less relevant then we could make
TIMESCALE smaller, or if we wanted to make rating recency
more relevant then we could make it bigger.
7This is motivated by examples where referees provided ex-
aggerated reports about their friends.
ratings about that provider's performance by its consumers
can be di®erent; re°ecting the phenomenon that every agent
has its own context making its own view di®erent.
Pro¯le Range of ¹P ¾P
Good [PL GOOD;PL PERFECT] 1:0
Ordinary [PL OK;PL GOOD] 2:0
Bad [PL WORST;PL OK] 2:0
Performance level Utility gained
PL PERFECT 10
PL GOOD 5
PL OK 0
PL BAD ¡5
PL WORST ¡10
Table 1: Pro¯les of provider agents.
3.2 Experimental Methodology
In each experiment, the testbed is populated with provider
and consumer agents. Each consumer is equipped with a
particular trust model, which helps it select a provider when
it needs to use a service. Since the only di®erence among
consumer agents is the trust models that they use, the util-
ity gained (UG) by each agent re°ects the performance of its
trust model in selecting reliable providers for interactions.
Hence, the testbed records the UG of each interaction along
with the trust model used. In order to obtain an accurate
result for performance comparisons between trust models,
each one will be employed by a large number of consumer
agents (NC). In addition, the average UG of agents em-
ploying the same trust models (called consumer groups) are
compared with each other's using the two-sample t-test [1]
(for means comparison) with a con¯dence level of 95%. The
result of an experiment is then presented in a graph with
two y-axes (see Fig. 1 for an example); the ¯rst plots the
UG means of consumer groups in each interaction and the
second plots the corresponding performance rankings ob-
tained from the t-test (pre¯xed by \R:", where the group
of rank 2 outperforms that of rank 1). The experimental
variables are presented in Table 2 and these will be used in
all experiments unless otherwise speci¯ed.
Simulation variable Symbol Value
Number of simulation rounds N 500
Total number of provider agents: NP 100
+ Good providers NPG 10
+ Ordinary providers NPO 40
+ Bad providers NPB 45
+ Intermittent providers NPI 5
Number of consumers in each group NC 500
Max. number of friend providers NFP 4
Table 2: Experimental variables.
Now, in each experiment, we include several groups of
consumers in order to compare their performance. These
include one group employing CR, one employing the SPO-
RAS model
8 (see Section 4 for details), one employing IT
9,
8SPORAS is chosen as the control benchmark because it
is a successful, independently developed trust model which
several other researchers have used for benchmarking.
9IT is de¯ned in Equation 6. It is calculated from a con--2
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Figure 1: Performance of CR vs SPORAS and NoTrust.
and one consisting of agents with no trust model. We name
these groups CR, SPORAS, IT and NoTrust. A summary of
the parameters of CR is provided in Table 3. The recency
factor ¸ is selected such that a 5-time-unit-old rating will
have a recency weight of 0:5 (to suit the time unit used in
the testbed). The default referee credibility TDRCr is set to
0:5 so that all ratings from newly encountered referees will
be taken into account in calculating CR, but their weights
are smaller than those of any proven accurate referee (which
are typically greater than ¶ = 0:5, see Equation 7) and larger
than that of a proven inaccurate one (which is typically neg-
ative). The value of ¶ is handpicked based on the actual vari-
ability of honest rating values in the testbed (which never
exceeds 0:5).
Parameters Symbol Value
Recency factor ¸ ¡
5
ln(0:5)
Number of stored references NR 10
Referee credibility parameters:
+ Default referee credibility TDRCr 0.5
+ Inaccuracy tolerance threshold ¶ 0.5
Table 3: CR's parameters.
3.3 Honest Environments
Having de¯ned the testbed and the evaluation methodology,
we now turn to the experiments themselves. The ¯rst thing
to test is whether CR helps consumer agents select pro¯table
providers (i.e. those yielding positive UG) from the popu-
lation and, by so doing, helps them gain better utility than
without using CR. Hence, in this experiment we evaluate the
performance of CR against that of NoTrust. SPORAS is also
included in this experiment to compare the performance of
CR with that of an independent benchmark that does not
use CR. Here, Fig. 1 shows that the NoTrust group, selecting
providers randomly without any trust evaluation, performs
consistently the lowest (as we would expect). On the other
hand, both SPORAS and CR prove to be bene¯cial to con-
sumer agents, helping them obtain signi¯cantly high UG.
This shows that the tested trust models can learn about the
provider population and allow their agents to select prof-
itable providers for interactions. In particular, SPORAS,
being a centralised service, is able to gather ratings about
all interactions in the system. This allows agents using it to
achieve high performance right from the ¯rst interactions.
sumer's ratings about a provider's performance which that
consumer collects in its rating store after every interaction.
In contrast, since each provider only shows a small num-
ber of ratings to agents using CR, they spend the ¯rst few
interactions learning about their environment. Hence their
initially lower performance than that of SPORAS. However,
agents using CR quickly catch up with those in SPORAS
(after 5 interactions) and they then maintain a higher sta-
ble performance thereafter (after the ¯rst 5 interactions, the
average UG per interaction of SPORAS and CR are 4:65 and
5:48, respectively). The t-test also con¯rms that this di®er-
ence is statistically signi¯cant as the ranks of SPORAS and
CR switch after the ¯rst 5 interactions. Here, it should be
noted that consumers may have di®erent views on the same
provider's performance because of the di®erent distances be-
tween them and the provider (see Section 3.1). Therefore,
although all the agents are honest, their ratings about that
provider can be di®erent due to their particular experience.
Now, SPORAS takes all ratings equally and, thus, such dif-
ferences are merely noise to it. This is the main reason that
limits its performance. In contrast, the referee credibility
model of CR compares each referee's ratings with an agent's
own ratings and gives higher weights to those referees that
have similar views to it. By so doing, the relevancy of each
rating is determined and taken into account in calculating
CR, making it more accurate than SPORAS.
Having shown that CR can outperform a centralised trust
model based on witness reports, we now test CR against
IT, which uses an agent's direct experience. Here, there are
two groups of consumer agents, IT and CR, using IT and
CR, respectively, as their trust models. The t-test results in
Fig. 2 shows that CR outperforms IT in all interactions. The
chart also shows that while it only takes agents using CR 5
interactions to achieve a stable level of performance, agents
using IT need more than 100 interactions to obtain a rea-
sonably stable level of performance. This is clearly because
agents in IT do not have adequate ratings to quickly learn
about their environment (i.e. the performance of providers).
Moreover, even the maximum UG of IT (4:85) is lower than
the average UG of CR (around 6:0). The reason is that agents
using IT can miss identifying the best providers because rat-
ings about them are less available than in the case of CR
and because agents in our testbed will stick to choosing the
highest trusted provider after a period of learning about the
environment
10 (resulting in locally sub-optimal provider se-
lections). Meanwhile, agents using CR always receive the
most recent and the best references that are actively pre-
sented by providers. Moreover, the high availability of these
references helps CR greatly increase its learning speed and,
thus, avoid the problems associated with IT.
In summary, we have shown that in honest environments,
CR provides a robust trust measure that is also highly avail-
able. However, we now go onto consider the more realistic
situations in which collusion can occur.
3.4 Biased Environments
In this section, we evaluate CR in a wider range of envi-
ronments. In particular, the consumers in each experiment
consist of honest referees and those from one of the four col-
luding referee groups (Exag1, Exag2, Extr1, and Extr2|see
Section 3.1). For example, Fig. 3 presents the result from
the experiment where the consumers consist of 20% honest
referees and 80% colluding referees from the Extr2 group.
10Agents in our testbed use a Boltzmann exploration strategy
to explore (i.e. try the service of) unknown providers.-1
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Figure 2: Performance of CR vs IT.
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Figure 3: 80% Extr2 referees.
Since NoTrust performs consistently poorly in all the exper-
iments, its results are omitted from our charts for the sake
of simplicity. Moreover, because of space constraints, we
cannot provide a detailed result of every experiment as in
Fig. 3. Instead, we plot the average UG per interaction of
SPORAS and CR in each experiment on the summary charts
in Figs. 4 and 5. In these charts, the plots are named as
GroupName:RefereeType. For example, SPORAS:Extr1 is the
plot for the average UG of agents in the SPORAS group when
the colluding referees in the testbed are of type Extr1.
The ¯rst thing these charts show is that collusion ad-
versely a®ects the performance of trust models (as we would
expect). For instance, Fig. 3 shows that it takes longer for
CR to reach a stable level of performance (i.e. to learn about
the colluding agents) and this performance is also lower
than that in an honest environment. In such circumstances,
SPORAS also yields a low UG and, without a credibility
model, it cannot improve its performance over time. We can
also see that the average performance of both SPORAS and
CR generally decreases when the number of colluding agents
increases (Figs. 4 and 5). However, CR always outperforms
SPORAS except in the case when 100% of the consumers
are Extr2 agents. In this particular experiment, since all
consumers are identi¯ed by CR as lying (because all of them
provide highly distorted references for all the providers), CR
stops using their references, thus, depressing performance.
However, this particular case (i.e. 100% extreme collusion)
is highly unlikely to happen in practice (and if it did one
might just retract trust from the population altogether). In
the remaining experiments, CR can easily detect referees
providing highly distorted references and maintain a gen-
erally high performance (see plots CR:Exag2 and CR:Extr2).
CR is less e®ective in ¯ltering out the colluding agents in
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Figure 4: Performance with exaggerating referees.
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Figure 5: Performance with extreme referees.
Exag1 and Extr1 since their colluded references are less dis-
torted than in the case of Exag2 and Extr2 (i.e. more di±cult
to detect lying). This suggests that the inaccuracy tolerance
threshold ¶ should be carefully selected to re°ect the nature
of biased behaviours in a particular environment, or bet-
ter, learning techniques could be used to enable an agent to
adjust this parameter according to the prevailing context.
In sum, this section shows that the credibility model of
CR enables it to outperform SPORAS in dealing with bi-
ased behaviours. Speci¯cally, it allows agents using CR to
maintain a robust and high performance in a variety of cases,
especially when the level of collusion is less than 50% (which
is, in our opinion, the most likely case in realistic scenarios).
4. RELATED WORK
Many trust and reputation models have been devised in re-
cent years due to the increasing recognition of their roles in
controlling social order in open systems [7]. SPORAS [13] is
one of the most notable of these models. In this model, each
agent rates its partner after an interaction and reports its
ratings to the centralised SPORAS repository. The received
ratings are then used to update the global reputation val-
ues of the rated agents. The model uses a learning function
for the updating process so that the reputation value can
closely re°ect an agent's performance. In addition, it also
introduces a reliability measure based on the standard de-
viations of the rating values. However, it has been designed
without considering the problem of inaccurate reports and
so it su®ers disproportionately when false information is col-
lected (as shown in Section 3).
Speaking more generally, as many trust models are builton witness reports, the problem of disinformation has come
to the fore in several recent works on trust. Regret [8] mod-
els a witness' credibility based on the di®erence between
that witness' opinion and an agent's past experience. This
di®ers to our approach in that it depends on the availabil-
ity of an agent's past experience. Moreover, this approach
cannot deal with the situations where the target agent's be-
haviour changes since it does not take the new behaviour
into account in its witness credibility assessment. Thus, it
can falsely punish honest witnesses (who report the target
agent's new behaviour). In Whitby et al.'s system [11], the
\true" rating of an agent is de¯ned by the majority's opin-
ions. In particular, they model the performance of an agent
as a beta probability density function (PDF) which is aggre-
gated from all witness ratings received. Then a witness is
considered unreliable and ¯ltered out when the reputation
derived from its ratings is judged to be too di®erent from
the majority's (by comparing the reputation value with the
PDF). Due to the dependency on PDFs of witness reports,
if these reports are scarce and/or too diverse it is not able to
recognise lying witnesses. Moreover, it is possible that a wit-
ness can lie in a small proportion of their reports without
being detected. In addition, isolated honest opinions (i.e.
di®erent than that of the majority) can be falsely punished.
To rectify this, TRAVOS uses an approach that is similar
to ours [10]. However, as it uses beta PDFs for representing
trust derived from binary outcomes (i.e. 0 for `failed', 1 for
`success'), it is not suitable for our CR model because we
require a more ¯ne-grained and continuous range for trust
values. In our earlier work [5], we presented a preliminary
model of CR. However, this model could not cope with col-
lusion and did not take the variance of referees situations
(see Section 3.3) into account.
The mechanism of CR has similarities to trust policy man-
agement engines such as PolicyMaker [3] and Trust-Serv [9].
These engines grant rights (i.e. trust) to an agent based on
its certi¯cates of its identity according to prede¯ned policies
(i.e. rules, such as `if a is a registered user and it possesses a
valid credit card then it can book °ights'). However, these
engines are designed to determine the access rights of agents,
rather than to determine the expected performance of these
agents (i.e. how the agents behave after they can access a
particular service). Similarly, the PGP web of trust model
[14] allows a person to prove the authenticity of his public
key by others' digital signatures, but not that person's be-
haviour. Certi¯ed ratings are also similar to the concept of
endorsements in [6]|certi¯cates endorsing that a service
(provider) is trusted and preferred by their issuers. How-
ever, such endorsements are one-value ratings and therefore
cannot show how good that service is (as our certi¯ed rat-
ings can by having values in [¡1;+1] in a context sensitive
way using rating terms). Moreover, the work in [6] does not
consider the problem of collusion.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has presented a novel mechanism for a new type
of trust|certi¯ed reputation. This model provides a num-
ber of advantages over current approaches. First, its mech-
anism addresses the problem of the lack of direct experi-
ence (since agents can typically collect a large number of
references themselves and they are incentivised to present
these to establish new trust relationships). Second, agents
are freed from the various costs involved in locating wit-
ness reports (e.g. resource, time, and communication costs).
Third, since CR allows agents to evaluate trust for them-
selves it does not require a centralised service and, thus,
is compatible with open multi-agent environments. In ad-
dition, in our evaluation we have shown CR performs sig-
ni¯cantly better than both a direct experience only model
and a successful centralised trust mechanism. We have also
shown that our CR model is robust against various types of
collusion between agents.
In the future, we aim to devise a method to automatically
adjust the accuracy tolerance threshold during the system's
operation (instead of handpicking a value as at present).
This can be achieved by analysing the recorded performance
levels of service providers that an agent has interacted with
to determine the likely variability of honest ratings. With
respect to the CR mechanism itself, we plan to elevate the
current presenting references process into a full dialog be-
tween the evaluator and the target agent. In so doing, the
evaluator can specify what type of reference it wants to see
(e.g. only the most recent ones, only references about trans-
actions of high values, or those from a selected set of refer-
ees). This dialog can be a full negotiation process in which
the evaluator can ask why a reference is bad and the tar-
get agent can explain a plausible reason for that. This will
further allow both agents to learn more about each other,
which clearly facilitates the trust evaluation process.
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